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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-4601 
 ___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
  
v. 
 
CHARLES PERNELL RIDDICK, JR. 
a/k/a Booper, 
 
                            Charles Pernell Riddick, Jr., 
                                                 Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Criminal No. 2:95-cr-00073-002) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 1, 2013 
 
 Before:  SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 2, 2013 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 In 1995, Charles Pernell Riddick, Jr., was part of a group of individuals indicted in 
connection with a drug ring centered around the Lehigh County Prison in Allentown, 
Pennsylvania.  Riddick himself was named in the first seven counts of the indictment.  
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Count one charged the members of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, 
whereas the remaining counts addressed certain of the overt acts committed as part of the 
conspiracy.  Counts two, four, and six charged violations of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a), relating 
to drug offenses committed in ―or within one thousand feet of‖ certain facilities, such as 
schools.  Following a jury trial, Riddick was convicted of all charges and was sentenced 
to life in prison.  We affirmed his conviction and sentence.  See United States v. Riddick, 
100 F.3d 949 (3d Cir. 1996) (table). 
 In late 2011, Riddick filed a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which 
allows a court to modify the sentence of a defendant ―who has been sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission.‖  He pointed to Amendment 591 to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, claiming that it had reduced his sentencing range (and, 
significantly, had eliminated the possibility of life imprisonment from its top end) by 
clarifying how offense guidelines were to be selected.  Riddick also maintained that the 
District Court’s original application of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2 was erroneous because a two-
point enhancement was applied to ―the amount of drugs attributed [to] the entire 
conspiracy‖ and not just to those sales connected with a 21 U.S.C. § 860 conviction.  
Finally, he also presented various personal factors for the Court’s consideration, such as 
his good behavior while incarcerated, his educational accomplishments since his 
conviction, and his family situation outside prison. 
 The District Court denied relief.  It held that Amendment 591 did not, as a matter 
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of law, affect Riddick’s sentence.  It noted, too, that his underlying arguments were 
meritless.   
Riddick timely sought review of the District Court’s order.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) to conduct plenary review of the 
District Court’s application of law.  See United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 519 
n.7 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. Williams, 551 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir. 2009). 
Enacted in 2000, Amendment 591 clarified that the initial selection of an offense 
guideline was to ―be based only on the statute (or offense) of conviction rather than on 
judicial findings of actual conduct . . . that will never be made by the jury.‖  United States 
v. Rivera, 293 F.3d 584, 585 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 
301–02 (3d Cir. 2001).  At issue here is U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2, the guideline associated with 
―drug offenses occurring near protected locations.‖  Riddick points out that the first count 
of the indictment, which charged the overarching conspiracy and reached far more drug-
related conduct than did the individual overt acts covered by the other counts, did not 
mention 21 U.S.C. § 860.  Hence, he asserts, the selection of the § 2D1.2 offense 
guideline for count-one conduct was incorrect post-Amendment 591, because the 
enhanced penalties provided by § 2D1.2 should not apply when he was not actually 
convicted of violating a statutory provision associated with that guideline.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1219–20 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).   
Riddick misunderstands the process that led to his actual sentence.  In his reply 
brief, for example, he follows U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a)(4) and recalculates the factors 
4 
 
associated with each separate count of his conviction, arriving at a base offense level of 
36 for the count-one conduct.  But he overlooks the fact that the counts were grouped 
according to U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) because, inter alia, ―the offense behavior [wa]s ongoing 
or continuous in nature‖ and the magnitude of the offense was based on ―the quantity of a 
substance.‖  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) (1995); see also PSR ¶ 64.1  When counts so grouped 
―involve offenses of the same general type to which different guidelines apply‖—as was 
the case here—the court is instructed to ―apply the offense guideline that produces the 
highest offense level.‖  U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(b) (1995).  Because Riddick was convicted of a 
28 U.S.C. § 860 offense that was grouped with other offenses, the court’s use of offense 
guideline § 2D1.2 was proper both before and after Amendment 591.  
Riddick’s argument regarding the use of incorrect drug quantities is unrelated to 
the promulgation of Amendment 591, which did not change the ―selection of the base 
offense level within that applicable offense guideline.‖  Rivera, 293 F.3d at 586.  Both 
the circa-1995 version and the current version of the Guidelines apply the § 2D1.2 
enhancement ―to the quantity of controlled substances directly involving a protected 
location‖ and advise that where ―only part of the relevant offense conduct directly 
involved a protected location or an underage or pregnant individual, subsections (a)(1) 
                                                 
1
 See United States v. Wood, 486 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2007) (observing that courts 
must generally apply the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing) (citation omitted).  
But see Peugh v. United States, No. 12–62, ___ U.S. ___, 2013 WL 2459523, at *14 
(June 10, 2013) (discussing exceptions to avoid Ex Post Facto violations).   
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and (a)(2) may result in different offense levels.‖2  As Riddick acknowledges, a court’s 
jurisdiction to correct or modify a defendant’s sentence is limited to those specific 
circumstances enumerated by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3582, and that statute does not 
authorize a plenary resentencing.  See Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2691 
(2010).  Thus, this claim falls ―outside the scope of a sentence modification under section 
3582.‖  United States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 616 (3d Cir. 2002); see also United 
States v. Evans, 587 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 2009) (observing that ―arguments for direct 
appeal . . . are not cognizable under § 3582(c)(2)‖) (citing United States v. Shaw, 30 F.3d 
26, 29 (5th Cir. 1994)).
3
  Similarly, Riddick’s request for a reduction of sentence based 
on personal factors is not a basis for relief under the limited scope of § 3582(c)(2).    
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                                 
2
 The Amendment altered Application Note 1 of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.2 to emphasize that the 
guideline should apply only to charged offenses, but left the remainder of the guideline 
unchanged. 
 
3
 To the extent that Riddick argues that the grouping of the counts of conviction under 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) was improper, he could have disputed the grouping on direct appeal, 
but did not do so.  See generally Br. for Appellant, 1995 WL 17778618.  We cannot 
reach the issue now.  Evans, 587 F.3d at 674.   
 
